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Abstract This paper describes subjective wage inequality and the demand for
redistribution in Austria using individuals’ estimates of occupational wages from
the International Social Survey Program. Although these estimates differ widely
across individuals, the data clearly show that most individuals would like to
decrease wage inequality, relative to the level of inequality which they perceive to
exist. The empirical analysis also shows that the demand for redistribution is
strongly associated not only with variables describing self-interested motives for
redistribution, but also with perceptions of and social norms with respect to
inequality. Further, the demand for redistribution is a strong predictor for whether
an individual is supportive of redistribution by the state. On the other hand, how-
ever, I find almost no evidence for an empirical association between the demand for
redistribution and individuals’ party identification.
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1 Introduction
In the mid-2000s, taxes and transfer payments reduced inequality in household
income among OECD member countries by about 34% on average (OECD 2008).
This simple figure underlines that governments typically exert substantial influence
on the distribution of market income through the collection of taxes and the
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provision of transfer payments. This holds also true for Austria, which will be the
focus of the empirical part of this paper, and for which the corresponding figure is
39%. If we start from the premise that political outcomes, such as the factual
amount of redistribution, must somehow relate to individuals’ preferences over
redistribution (e.g. Borck 2007), the question comes up whether and to what extent
the actual amount of redistribution mirrors individuals’ perceptions of wage
inequality as well as their normative beliefs of the just distribution of wages, and
how these perceptions and beliefs translate into the political and economic
outcomes.
Indeed, recent theoretical work in economics has convincingly pushed the idea
that the amount of redistribution is linked to individuals’ attitudes towards
distributive justice (Alesina and Angeletos 2005) and to individuals’ perception of
whether differences in earnings are primarily due to either luck or due to individual
effort (Be´nabou and Tirole 2006), respectively. Such theoretical arguments are
supported by some interesting empirical evidence on the assumed link between
social norms and beliefs on the one hand and economic and political outcomes on
the other hand. For example, Di Tella et al. (2007) analyze a situation which
randomly granted legal land titles to some land squatters near Buenos Aires, which
secured those squatters endowments (in stark contrast to those squatters that were
not granted land titles). Their analysis shows that those squatters who were given
legal land titles developed more materialist and individualistic beliefs than their
unlucky but otherwise identical counterparts. A recent paper by Giuliano and
Spilimbergo (2009) even shows that individuals who grow up during a recession
have different beliefs than individuals growing up in an economic boom. The
reverse channel, running from norms to outcomes, has been studied in Stutzer and
Lalive (2004). They use regional variation in a national referendum on the level of
unemployment benefits in Switzerland as a measure for the norm not to work off
public benefits. Their analysis shows that the social norm to work has a significant
impact on average unemployment duration.
Most of the available empirical evidence on the issue, however, rather focuses on
the determinants of individuals’ demand for redistribution and their support for the
welfare state (Alesina and Giuliano 2009; Alesina and La Ferrara 2005; Corneo and
Gru¨ner 2002; Fong 2001). These studies typically find that attitudes towards the
welfare state and individuals’ perceptions of which factors determine one’s income
are all associated with the demand for redistribution. For example, people who think
that luck is an important determinant of income tend to be more in favor of
redistribution. A second typical finding is that income by itself appears to be a
surprisingly poor predictor of the demand for redistribution, given its prominent role
in the economic literature (e.g. Meltzer and Richard 1981). In an interesting take on
the issue Alesina and Fuchs-Schu¨ndeln (2007) additionally stress the role of the
prevailing economic and political institutions on individual preferences, comparing
individuals’ attitudes from former East and West Germany. They find that East
Germans are much more supportive of the state than West Germans and that it will
take a couple of generations until attitudes will converge between the two regions.
This abundance of empirical evidence on the determinants of the demand for
redistribution notwithstanding, and even though it seems an obvious task to link
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people’s preferences over redistribution with their party identification, evidence on
the hypothesized link between attitudes and norms on the one hand and political
outcomes on the other hand is scarce.1 Alesina and Angeletos (2005) provide some
tentative empirical evidence on the relation between the belief that luck determines
income and individuals’ political orientation, i.e. they show that individuals who
believe that luck determines income tend to be found left on the political spectrum.
Guiso et al. (2006) make the connection between preferences and political
outcomes explicit, showing that the actual amount of redistribution and preferences
are indeed related to each other. Kuhn (2009) finds indirect evidence for the link
between people’s attitudes and political outcomes in Switzerland, showing quite a
strong empirical association between various subjective inequality measures and
individuals’ support for redistribution by the state. Moreover, he finds a substantial
impact of these inequality measures on individuals’ party identification.
In this paper I will use a simple and intuitive conceptual framework to measure
inequality from an individual’s subjective point of view. Based on the framework I
study the association between subjective inequality measures and individuals’
support for the welfare state and individuals’ stated party preferences, respectively,
relying on survey data from Austria. Austria is, inter alia, an interesting country for
further inquiry because it belongs to the group of countries with lowest inequality in
disposable household income.2 I use the conceptual framework suggested by Kuhn
(2009), who applied it to Swiss survey data. This framework yields various
measures that describe both the perception of actual wage inequality and the
normative assessment of the desired wage inequality at the individual level, and it
also leads to a very natural conceptualization of the demand for redistribution as the
discrepancy between an individual’s ethical assessment and his or her actual
perception of wage inequality. This contrasts with the available empirical work,
which almost exclusively relies on survey questions that directly ask individuals
about their attitude towards and support for the welfare state. Compared to these
‘conventional’ survey questions, which often have multiple meanings, the measure
used in this paper has the advantage that it has a clear focus on wage comparisons
across different occupations. Moreover, it has the virtue of making the distinction
between individuals’ actual and ethical wage estimates possible, a conceptual
distinction which gets completely lost when using conventional survey measures of
the demand for redistribution.
In the following empirical analysis I will study the association between potential
motives for redistribution and the proposed measure of the demand for
1 There is some related evidence from political science. First, there is aggregate evidence showing that
welfare retrenchment is associated with partisan politics (Allan and Scruggs 2004; Korpi and Palme
2003). At the individual level, there is research showing that individuals’ preferences over political issues
are associated with party identification (Carsey and Layman 2006; Goren 2005).
2 Inequality in market income in Austria is lower than in most other OECD countries to start with (OECD
2008). This most likely relates to the high degree of centralization of wage bargaining in Austria (e.g.
Wallerstein et al. 1997). The structure of wage bargaining also fits the observation that relative wage
structures seem to be rather rigid (Hofer et al. 2001) and wage mobility to be rather low (Hofer and
Weber 2002). At the same time, however, public transfers are quite weakly targeted. Consequently, the
reduction in inequality due to transfers and taxes is comparatively low in Austria, relative to the amount
of resources that is involved (OECD 2008).
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redistribution. Specifically, I will focus on economic incentives (e.g. individuals’
financial self-interest) on the one hand and individuals’ perceptions and norms with
respect to distributive justice on the other hand. While economists have usually
focused on individuals’ income as main predictor of their demand for redistribution,
recent empirical work suggests that perceptions of the factors that actually
determine income and normative beliefs about which factors should determine
income are at least as important predictors. For example, several studies have shown
that people who believe that luck is an important determinant of income tend to
have a higher demand for redistribution than, say, people perceiving personal effort
as an important determinant of income (e.g. Corneo and Gru¨ner 2002; Fong 2001).
Further, in an attempt to provide some tentative empirical evidence on the link
between individuals’ attitudes toward wage inequality and their political prefer-
ences, I study whether these subjective measures are associated with individuals’
support for the welfare state. To this end, I estimate the association between
individuals’ demand for redistribution on the one hand and their support for the
welfare state in a more general sense as well as their support for progressive taxation
on the other hand. Finally, I check whether these measures are associated with
individuals’ stated party identification. If people care about distributional issues
they will presumably support the political parties with an agenda close to their
distributional preferences, and thus one arguably expect that individuals’ demand
for redistribution is a good predictor of their party identification.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 shortly describes
the data source. Special emphasis is given to individuals’ estimates of occupational
wages available in these data. In Sect. 3, I will discuss the simple framework
suitable for the analysis of subjective inequality measures and the demand for
redistribution along with corresponding descriptive statistics. The main empirical
analysis is presented and discussed in Sect. 4. Section 5 concludes.
2 Data
I use data from the International Social Survey Program (ISSP), an annual survey
program aimed at establishing internationally comparable data on several key
themes as religion, the role of government and social inequality, inter alia. The ISSP
organized its first survey focusing on social inequality in 1987 and a second and a
third survey followed in the years 1992 and 1999, respectively (a fourth survey is
scheduled for 2009). Although Austria took part in all three surveys, the data on
occupational wage estimates that are key for the conceptual framework are not
available in the 1992 survey. Because there have also been some changes to the key
variables over time I will focus exclusively on the data from 1999 survey.
2.1 Subjective estimates of occupational wages
The variables that are key for the subsequent empirical analysis are individuals’
subjective estimates of the wages of people working in different occupations.
Specifically, individuals were asked to estimate what they thought that people
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working in nine different occupations and their coworkers actually earn and ought to
earn (before taxes and social security contributions), respectively (Appendix A
contains the exact wording of the questions and the list of occupations).
Table 1 shows descriptive statistics for these wage estimates.3 According to
Table 1, for example, individuals perceive the gross monthly wage of a shop
assistant to be about €1; 264 on average, while they on average think that a shop
assistant should earn about €1; 544 a month, yielding a difference between desired
and perceived wage of about €280 per month. Note that the real wage of a shop
assistant is not the focus of this study because misperceptions of factual wage rates
are one important reason why people might demand (different amounts of)
redistribution. In the case of a lawyer, by way of comparison, the average perceived
monthly wage (about €7; 890) is considerably higher than what the average person
would judge as appropriate (about €5; 940 only).
Figure 1 plots the average estimates of actual and desired wages for each
occupation to make the main features of these estimates more visible. First, people
seem to accept rather large differences in wages across occupations on average as
there is a very clear-cut ranking of the occupations not only with respect to actual
wages, but also with respect to desired wages. Moreover, note also that the ranking
of the occupations as regards their just wages is exactly the same as the ranking with
respect to their actual wages. Thus people not only think that a lawyer actually earns
Table 1 Individuals’ subjective estimates of occupational wages
Actual wage Ethical wage
(a) Bottom group:
Unskilled worker 1,170.37 (304.40) 1,411.62 (409.06)
Shop assistant 1,263.61 (304.33) 1,544.12 (412.86)
Skilled worker 1,646.91 (423.40) 1,887.64 (484.87)
(b) Top group:
Doctor 5,960.82 (5,222.48) 5,365.46 (3,729.71)
Judge 6,772.14 (4,222.56) 5,481.61 (3,090.27)
Lawyer 7,892.25 (5,666.69) 5,944.27 (4,129.51)
Minister 10,083.33 (5,335.44) 6,296.60 (3,418.85)
Chairman 10,983.98 (8,889.57) 7,690.27 (6,270.98)
Owner factory 13,574.40 (12,619.85) 9,982.49 (9,797.28)
(c) Respondent’s occupation
Coworker 1,843.64 (1,060.26) 2,074.53 (1,209.94)
Notes: Table entries are average estimates of actual and ethical wages (in €, gross per month). Standard
deviations are given in parentheses. All numbers are based on 707 observations except coworkers’ wage
estimates which are based on 653 and 658 observations, respectively. See also Appendix A
3 The original wage estimates in the survey are given in units of the former Austrian currency, the
Austrian Schilling. To simplify the reading of the table I have converted all numbers into Euros, using the
exchange rate at which the Austrian Schilling was replaced by the Euro ð1€ ¼ 13:7603ATSÞ: Since
almost all of the subsequent analysis is based on relative comparisons, the exact choice of exchange rate
does not matter on substantial grounds.
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more than a shop assistant, they also tend to think that a lawyer ought to earn more
than a shop assistant. Second, average estimates for actual and desired wages differ
considerably from each other within each occupation. However, they do so to a very
different degree. For example, the average ethical wage estimate is higher than the
actual wage estimate in the case of the shop assistant, while the reverse holds true
for the lawyer. Third, there are three occupations (i.e. unskilled worker, shop
assistant and skilled worker) for which both actual and ethical wages are
comparatively low and for whom ethical wages are higher than actual wages. The
reverse holds true for the remaining six occupations, while coworkers’ wages fall
right in between these two groups.
3 Conceptual framework
This section shortly discusses the building blocks of a simple conceptual framework
suitable for describing subjective wage inequality and the demand for redistribution.
The framework that I use is borrowed from and discussed in more detail in Kuhn
(2009).
First note that, to measure objective wage inequality in some subpopulation of
size n, it is sufficient to observe the corresponding vector of wages:
y ¼ fyð1Þ; . . .; yðiÞ; . . .; yðnÞg; ð1Þ
as most inequality indices are a function of y only. The measurement of subjective
wage inequality is a simple generalization in that the vector of wages now becomes
a function of the evaluation of these wages by a specific individual:
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Fig. 1 Individuals’ subjective estimates of actual and ethical wages, by occupation. Notes: The triangles
correspond to individuals’ average estimates of actual occupational wages. The circles shows average
estimates of ethical occupational wages. The number of observations equals 707 except in the case of
coworkers’ actual (ethical) wage, which is based on 653 (658) observations only (see also Table 1)
220 Empirica (2010) 37:215–236
123
yðiÞw ¼ fyðiÞwð1Þ; . . .; yðiÞwðiÞ; . . .; yðiÞwðnÞg ð2Þ
Thus, subjective inequality may differ across individuals because individuals may
have different evaluations of occupational wages. As a consequence, while
objective inequality can be summarized by one inequality measure only, subjective
inequality is described by a distribution of inequality indices across individuals. The
second distinguishing feature is that subjective wage data allow the distinction
between individuals’ estimates of both actual and ethical wages (denoted by
superscript w = a and w = e, respectively).
Further note that Eq. (2) can be approximated by group-level data, analogous to
objective wage data again. In the simplest possible case there are only two groups of
occupations, representing the lower and the upper part of the occupational
distribution. In this case, the wage distribution across occupations is fully described
by three different moments only (note that ftop = (1 - fbottom) because there are
only two groups):
ðyðiÞabottom; yðiÞatop; fbottomÞ; and ð3aÞ
ðyðiÞebottom; yðiÞetop; fbottomÞ; ð3bÞ
with yðiÞbottom and yðiÞtop denoting an individual’s wage estimate for the lower and
the upper part of the occupational distribution, respectively. Formula (3a) is used to
approximate an individual’s perceived distribution of actual wages while formula
(3b) approximates his or her imagination of the ethical wage distribution.4 Indi-
viduals’ estimates of actual and ethical wages for different occupations as well as
the distribution of occupations in the sample are used to compute the three moments
in (3a) and (3b), respectively.5 These numbers in turn are sufficient to compute the
Gini coefficient for both actual and ethical wages at the individual level as follows
(as shown in Kuhn 2009):
GðiÞw ¼ fbottom  qwðiÞbottom; ð4Þ
where w = a (w = e) again refers to the actual (ethical) wage distribution and
where qðiÞwbottom equals the wage share of the bottom group. Because the group
weights are assumed to be the same for the actual and the ethical wage distribution
as well as across individuals, all differences between individuals as regards their
evaluation of wage inequality must be due to differences in their estimates of
occupational wages.6
4 Several researchers have pointed out that social justice must be a function of an individual’s
perceptions and ethical beliefs. See Jasso (1999), Osberg and Smeeding (2006), and Sen (2000), among
others.
5 More specifically, yðiÞbottom is computed as the simple average of an individuals’ wage estimates for a
shop assistant, an unskilled worker, and a skilled worker. Analogously, yðiÞtop is computed as the average
of an individual’s wage estimates for the remaining six white-collar occupations. See also Table 1 and
Appendix A. Finally, the fraction of individuals belonging to the bottom group, fbottom, is estimated from
the occupational distribution in the sample using the International Standard Classification of Occupations.
6 It is well known that the Gini coefficient based on grouped data will generally be lower than if based on
individual level data due to convexity of the Lorenz curve (e.g. Gastwirth and Glauberman 1976), unless
there is no within-group variation of wages.
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In what follows, I use the desired reduction in the perceived level of actual wage
inequality as measure for the demand for redistribution, multiplied by -1 to fit the
intuition that higher values of the measure indicate a higher demand for
redistribution:
RðiÞ ¼ 1  GðiÞ
e
GðiÞa  1
 
¼ 1  GðiÞ
e
GðiÞa
 
ð5Þ
Because the population weights are fixed, the only reason why G(i)e and G(i)a can
possibly differ and thereby give rise to any demand for redistribution is because the
ethical wage shares of the two group differ from the corresponding actual wage
shares.7 Moreover, R(i) has the feature that a higher perceived inequality and a
lower desired inequality, respectively, lead to a higher demand for redistribution
ceteris-paribus. It is exactly this feature of the measure that seems to perfectly fit our
own intuition about the demand for redistribution. Note that for most of the
measures used in the empirical literature such ceteris-paribus comparisons are not
possible because they confound these two dimensions.
However, it must be noted that R(i) is only informative about the degree of
desired wage equalization across different occupations. An important limitation of
this measure therefore is that it tells us nothing about desired redistribution from the
economically active part of the population to individuals who are not in the labor
force (e.g. unemployed workers, retirees, children) or about redistribution through
the provision of public goods (e.g. education).
3.1 Descriptive statistics
Table 2 shows descriptive statistics for the different subjective inequality indices
discussed in the preceding section. As expected, the average subjective Gini
coefficient describing individuals’ perceived wage distribution is positive on
average (about 0.335) and remarkably higher than the average Gini coefficient
describing the desired wage distribution (which is equal to about 0.229).
It is also interesting to note that all individuals perceive at least some wage
inequality and that only a tiny fraction (about 0.4%) of all individuals judges
absolute equality as their desired wage distribution, suggesting that absolutely equal
wages across occupations is in general not judged as a fair distribution.
Consequently, individuals demand a positive and quantitatively significant amount
of redistribution on average. Average demand for redistribution equals 0.311,
implying that individuals want to decrease wage inequality by about one third,
relative to the level of inequality that they perceive to exist. Table 2 also shows the
fraction of individuals exhibiting a negative, null or positive demand for
redistribution (see below). Not surprisingly, however, an overwhelming majority
of individuals desires a positive amount of redistribution.
7 I have re-run part of the analysis using the difference between the two inequality indices as a measure
for desired redistribution, i.e. using DGðiÞ ¼ 1  ½GðiÞ j  GðiÞa as dependent variable. The results turn
out to be qualitatively the same (results not shown).
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Panel (a) of Fig. 2 shows the joint distribution of the two subjective inequality
measures. This figure shows that there is pronounced heterogeneity not only in the
beliefs that people hold, but also in the perceptions they have. Moreover, there is
variation in the desired level of inequality for any given level of perceived
inequality. Further, it is also clear that most individuals favor a level of wage
inequality that is somewhat lower than what they actually perceive, as most of the
points lie below the 45 line (indicating no demand for redistribution at all).
Consequently, the resulting distribution of the demand for redistribution takes on
positive values for most individuals, as shown in panel (b) Fig. 2.8 However, there
are also some individuals with a value on the demand for redistribution that is larger
than one and some individuals with a negative value on this measure even. Closer
inspection of the first case reveals that a demand higher than one results for
individuals who would like to overturn the ranking of the two groups (however,
there are only two observations where this happens). A negative value for the
demand for redistribution most often results from individuals’ desire to increase all
wages, but the wages of the top group to an even higher degree than the wages of the
bottom group. Thus, because the overall wage level is not held constant, a negative
demand is not exactly the same as a regressive transfer.
4 Empirical analysis
4.1 Motives for demanding redistribution
Given the huge amount of heterogeneity in both inequality perceptions and
normative beliefs, it is not really evident whether individuals’ perceptions and
Table 2 Subjective inequality measures and the demand for redistribution
Mean Standard deviation
Gini coefficient, actual wage distribution 0.335 0.120
1(Actual Gini = 0) 0.000
Gini coefficient, ethical wage distribution 0.229 0.110
1(Ethical Gini = 0) 0.004
Demand for redistribution 0.311 0.233
1(Demand \ 0) 0.047
1(Demand = 0) 0.033
1(0 \ Demand \ 1) 0.914
1(Demand = 1) 0.004
1(Demand [ 1) 0.003
Notes: All table entries are based on 707 observations. All wage estimates in panel (a) and (b) are given
in € . All variables are defined in the main text. 1() denotes the indicator function
8 Figure 2 makes it also clear that it is perfectly appropriate to use standard linear regression models in
this case, as opposed to the conventional measures that have been analyzed in the literature so far. These
measures are most often of ordinal nature only and thus require more sophisticated (but also more difficult
to interpret) statistical models.
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beliefs have some structure at all. In a first step, I therefore investigate different
potential motives for demanding redistribution that have been put forward in the
literature (Fong et al. 2005, survey the relevant lines of argument).
Clearly, the one motive for redistribution that has received most attention from
economists is individuals’ financial self-interest (e.g. Meltzer and Richard 1981).
Because individuals act self-interested, simple models of redistribution predict that
an individual’s support for redistribution decreases with his or her personal income
(Roberts 1977). As it turns out, however, personal income is a surprisingly poor
predictor of the support for redistribution (Corneo and Gru¨ner 2002; Fong 2001).
One potential explanation is that the impact of own income is not as immediate as in
a simple theoretical model. For example, individuals’ income may change over time
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for a variety of reasons. Therefore, the poor may refrain from taxing the rich if they
believe that they may become rich sometime in the future and people who have
moved upward within the income distribution for whatever reason will arguably
tend to think that own effort pays off. For these reasons it has been argued that
income mobility is one important mediating factor (Be´nabou and Ok 2001; Piketty
1995). A second important explanation for the weak effect of income is based on the
argument that relative comparisons, and not differences in absolute income, are key
to individuals’ satisfaction with their income situation (Clark and Oswald 1996;
Senik 2005), and the same argument may apply to the support for redistribution.
More specifically, it is probably not so much the absolute level of income, but the
satisfaction with own income that impacts the demand for redistribution.
Previous empirical research has also consistently shown that individuals’
perceptions and normative beliefs are at least as important predictors of the support
for redistribution as people’s income. I therefore also include measures of the most
important principles with respect to distributive justice, namely equity (or
proportionality) and needs (Dawes et al. 2007), as well as people’s perceptions of
the extent to which either acquired (e.g. education) or ascribed (e.g. gender) features
actually are important in determining one’s pay.
Broadly speaking, then, I model the demand for redistribution as a function of
individuals’ self-interest as well as of their inequality perceptions and their
normative beliefs in ethical principles related to distributional justice. The
econometric model thus takes the following form:
Ri ¼ b0 þ self-interestic1 þ beliefsic2 þ controlsib þ i; ð6Þ
where Ri is the demand for redistribution as given by Eq. (5). I try to include
measures that match the theoretical predictors as close as possible (see Appendix A
for additional details). First, the vector self-interesti contains the logarithm of family
income, a measure for a worker’s dissatisfaction with his own income, as well as a
variable measuring an individual’s past experience of upward mobility. On would
expect a negative effect on Ri in the case of log family income and mobility, and a
positive effect in the case of income dissatisfaction. A second group of regressors
(beliefsi) includes individuals’ perceptions of how wages are determined in reality
and their normative beliefs with respect to the just distribution of wages (subsumed
under the vector beliefsi). More specifically, there are two different variables
describing individuals’ perceptions. The first variable measures whether people
think that acquired skills or active inputs, like educational attainment and personal
effort, are in reality relevant for determining pay. The second variable measures the
weight that people attach to ascribed skills or inputs beyond an individual’s control,
like knowing the right people, in determining one’ wage. Moreover, I include two
variables that try to measure the principles of proportionality and needs,
respectively. To this end, I have constructed a first variable that measures the
extent to which an individual thinks that things like a worker’s schooling and effort
should ultimately determine his or her pay. A second variables tries to capture the
extend to which an individual beliefs that things like the number of children should
be important for determining pay. Here, I would expect that both the perception of
and the belief in effort being important should reduce the demand for redistribution
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while the perception of and the belief in needs should increase the demand for
redistribution. Finally, the third vector (controlsi) includes additional control
variables that are likely correlated with potential but unobserved confounding
variables like, for example, risk aversion.9
Estimates of c1 and c2 are shown in Table 3. The first two models focus on self-
interested motives only, with and without controlling for background characteris-
tics, respectively. The next two models focus on the effects of the variables
describing individuals’ beliefs and perceptions (again, with and without background
controls). Finally, both sets of regressors are included in the last three models, and
the ultimate model additionally includes the interaction between log family income
and income dissatisfaction to check whether the effect of income depends on the an
individual’s assessment of his or her wage.
The first row shows that, as expected, income has a negative and statistically
significant effect on the demand for redistribution. The corresponding parameter
estimates range between about -0.045 and -0.075. The effect of income is actually
quite large in economic terms as the parameter estimates imply an elasticity of the
demand for redistribution with respect to income of about -0.14 to about -0.24, if
evaluated at the mean value of the dependent variable. Nonetheless, the predicted
average demand for redistribution for individuals with highest income is still
positive.10 Interestingly, income dissatisfaction has a large positive effect, i.e.
individuals who think that they should earn more than they actually do have a higher
demand for redistribution. The model in the last column adds the interaction term
between the log of income and income dissatisfaction to the set of regressors.
Interestingly, the interaction term turns out to be negative, implying that the effect
of income is the more negative for those individuals with higher income
dissatisfaction. Contrary to expectation, however, the effect of the mobility index
turns out to be insignificant and essentially zero in economic terms.
The next four rows show the estimated effect of individuals’ beliefs and
perceptions. The two belief variables, labelled needs and effort, both have the
expected sign and quite strong effects on the demand for redistribution across all
specifications. A one standard deviation increase in the belief that needs should be
important in determining pay, for example, increases the demand for redistribution
by about 0.03 (which corresponds to a relative increase of about 9%). The belief in
effort has the expected negative sign and, similarly, has also quite a strong effect on
the dependent variable. Increasing effort by one standard deviation results in an
increase of about -0.029 (corresponding to a relative decrease of about 9.5%).
Turning to individuals’ perceptions of how pay is actually determined, only one of
9 The full list of background controls is the following: Age (in years), a female dummy, educational
attainment (in years), the number of persons in the household, two dummy variables indicating
employment and retirement status, respectively, a dummy for living in an urban/suburban region, and a
set of dummies for the state of residence. Table 6 provides summary statistics for these variables.
10 For example, using the estimates from the model shown in column (6), the average predicted demand
for redistribution is 0.287 for individuals in the highest income bracket. Although this number is clearly
much lower than the average demand of the poorest individuals in the sample (sample average of 0.416),
these individuals still have a positive demand for redistribution on average.
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the two included variables, i.e. the perception that ‘acquired’ skills, has any
statistical impact on the demand for redistribution. Again, a hypothetical increase of
one standard deviation leads to a predicted decrease in the dependent variable of
about 0.026, which corresponds roughly to a relative decrease of 8.3%.
The results from Table 3 yield a consistent picture: all models yield the same
results qualitatively, whether background controls are included or not. Further, all
regressors of interest have the expected sign, except the index of mobility and the
variable describing whether an individual thinks that ascribed skills are important
for getting ahead which are not statistically different from zero. In both cases, this
seems to be a result from point estimates that are essentially zero (and not because
the precision of the estimates is low). Overall, these results also fit well into the
previous empirical literature (e.g. Corneo and Gru¨ner 2002; Fong 2001).
4.2 Support for the welfare state
Even though most individuals have a latent demand for redistribution, it is a-priori
not clear whether these individuals also think that the government should be doing
something about it. Further, as mentioned in Sect. 3 before, support for the welfare
state and thus redistribution in a more general sense also includes redistribution from
the working population to people that are economically not active (e.g. retirees).
To assess the empirical link between individuals’ latent demand for redistribution
and their support for the welfare state, I regress two simple measure of individuals’
support for the welfare state on some of the subjective inequality measures that have
been discussed before.11 I then run several regression models similar to Eq. (6), only
that now the support for redistribution by the state is the dependent variable and the
demand for redistribution Ri is the key regressor:
supporti ¼ b0 þ Ria þ self-interestic1 þ beliefsic2 þ controlsib þ i; ð7Þ
where supporti is one of two distinct measures for individuals’ support for
redistribution by the state. I am now mainly interested in parameter a which
quantifies the effect of individuals’ subjective inequality perception on their
propensity to support redistribution by the state. As shown in the preceding section,
the independent variables describing different motives for demanding redistribution
quite strongly correlate with Ri. I therefore also show results when only the
background control variables are included as regressors.
Table 4 shows the resulting estimates. The dependent variable in the first two
columns is individuals’ general support for redistribution by the state, and their
specific support for progressive taxation in the remaining two columns. The first
model of each panel includes only the socio-demographic controls while the second
model additionally includes the measures of self-interested motives for redistribu-
tion as well as people’s beliefs and norms. We may first note that there is
considerable support for redistribution by the state (the average of the dependent
11 The first variable is the agreement with the following statement: ‘‘It is the responsibility of the
government to reduce the differences in income between people with high incomes and those with low
incomes.’’ The second variable measures individuals’ agreement with the statement that ‘‘people with
high incomes should pay a larger share of their income in taxes than those with low incomes.’’
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variable equals 3.78, on a scale ranging from 1 to 5) and even higher support
for proportionally higher taxation of richer people (average of 4.15 on a scale from
1 to 5).
We can see that the demand for redistribution has a large positive and significant
effect on individuals’ support for redistribution by the state, i.e. people who desire a
more equal distribution of occupational wages tend to be more in favor of
redistribution by the state. This holds true regardless of the specific set of control
variables that are included in the model, although the point estimate is somewhat
reduced by the inclusion of additional controls (only including background controls
yields a point estimate of 0.988, while additionally controlling for self-interested
motives and beliefs leads to a smaller point estimate of 0.904). The size of the effect
turns out to be large in substantive terms as the elasticity of the support for
redistribution by the state with respect to the demand for redistribution equals about
7.5% (=100% [(0.3110.904)/3.788]) if evaluated at mean values (and using the
point estimate of the second column).
Similar results are obtained for people’s support for progressive taxation.
Individuals with a high latent demand for redistribution tend to be more supportive
of taxing the rich. Also as before, the corresponding effects are large in economic
terms. The point estimate shown in the last column implies an elasticity of the
support for progressive taxation with respect to the demand for redistribution of
about 2.2% (=100% [(0.311  -0.287)/4.150]).
Table 4 Support for redistribution by the state and progressive taxation
‘‘Government should reduce
income differences’’
‘‘Richer people should pay higher
taxes’’
Mean 3.788 4.150
Standard deviation 1.141 0.668
Demand for redistribution 0.988 (0.224)*** 0.904 (0.223)*** 0.363 (0.113)*** 0.287 (0.111)**
Controls included? Yes Yes Yes Yes
Self-interested motives
included?
No Yes No Yes
Beliefs included? No Yes No Yes
# observations 685 685 685 685
P (F-statistic) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Adjusted R-squared 0.202 0.222 0.134 0.153
Notes: *, **, *** denote statistical significance on the 10, 5, and 1% level, respectively. Robust standard
errors in parentheses. See also notes of Table 3. The dependent variable in the first two columns is the
(dis)agreement to the statement: ‘‘It is the responsibility of the government to reduce the differences in
income between people with high incomes and those with low incomes.’’ The dependent variable in the
last two columns is the (dis)agreement with the statement that ‘‘people with high incomes should pay a
larger share of their income in taxes than those with low incomes.’’ The two dependent variables range
from 1 to 5
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4.3 Party identification
Political parties in Austria differ markedly if positioned on a simple left-right scale
by national political experts (e.g. Castles and Mair 1997; Huber and Inglehart
1995).12 If individuals’ demand for redistribution really shapes government’s action
towards inequality, then we would also expect an association between the subjective
inequality measures and individuals’ preferences over political parties. On the other
hand, however, politics is not exclusively about issues of redistribution. Indeed,
‘new politics’ (e.g. new versus traditional culture, immigration, environmental
issues) play an important role in Austria and interfere with economic issues
(Knutsen 1998). Most notably in this respect is probably the evolution of support for
the right-wing Austrian Freedom Party, which moved from the center to the far right
and which managed to attract a significant fraction of blue-collar workers as their
supporters mainly by ‘‘combining opposition to immigration with free-market
economic and socio-cultural conservatism’’ (McGann and Kitschelt 2005, p.148).
Thus it may also be the case that these ‘new politics’ issues are more important than
redistributive issues.13
It is therefore an empirical question whether individuals’ demand for redistri-
bution predicts their party preferences. I therefore estimate the association between
the demand for redistribution and individuals’ stated preference over different
political parties:
1ðPartyi ¼ jÞ ¼ b0 þ Ria þ self-interestic1 þ beliefsic2 þ controlsib þ i; ð8Þ
where the dependent variable 1 (Partyi = j) is a dummy variable indicating whether
individual i would vote for party j.14 The variables on the right-hand side are exactly
the same as before. For the ease of interpretation, I estimate the parameters from Eq.
(8) by ordinary least squares instead of using a nonlinear model like, for example, a
probit.15 In the analysis, I only consider the four political parties that had the largest
share of votes at the time the survey was administered. These are the Austrian Social
Democrats (‘‘Sozialdemokratische Partei O¨sterreichs’’, SPO¨), the conservative
Austrian People’s Party (‘‘O¨sterreichische Volkspartei’’, O¨VP), the right-wing
Austrian Freedom Party (‘‘Freiheitliche Partei O¨sterreichs’’, FPO¨), and the Green
Party (‘‘Die Gru¨nen’’). Note that the sample size is somewhat reduced because of
missing information on party preference for some individuals: there remain 534 out
of the original 707 observations.
12 For the year 1993, mean positions range from 2.86 (The Green Party) to 8.64 (FPO¨), on a scale from 0
to 10. See Appendix B in Huber and Inglehart (1995).
13 Indeed, the positions of the two big parties in Austria (O¨VP, SPO¨) have converged to a significant
degree, at least as regards social policy, as argued by Seeleib-Kaiser et al. (2005). This is consistent with
Knutsen (1998) who shows that, from the standpoint of political experts, the SPO¨ has moved to the right
in recent years.
14 I have also re-estimated the same models using only those individuals who do state preference for any
political party. The results are qualitatively the same as the ones obtained from using all available
observations (results not shown).
15 I have also estimated a series of probit models and a multinomial logit model. It turns out that the
results are virtually the same (results available upon request). I therefore stick to the model with the
easiest interpretation.
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Estimation results are given in Table 5. The first column of each panel shows
estimates when only baseline controls are included while the second column shows
estimates that also control for variables describing individuals’ financial self-interest
and their perceptions and beliefs. As before, I show both sets of results because
some of the regressors and the demand for redistribution are highly correlated.
Quite surprisingly, and in stark contrast to the results for individuals’ support for
redistribution by the state, all key parameters turn out to be statistically insignificant
(the only exception is a significant effect of the demand for redistribution on the
probability of voting for the O¨VP). However, this effect also turns insignificant once
beliefs and perceptions are included as regressors. Moreover, the insignificance
seems to be mainly a result of small point estimates, and less so a result of
imprecision of those estimates. For example, the point estimate for the effect of the
demand for redistribution on stated party preference for the social-democratic party
is 0.071, which yields a predicted change in the probability of stating preference for
the social-democratic party of 1.65 percentage points for a hypothetical increase in
the demand for redistribution of one standard deviation (which equals 0.233).16 In
most cases, the lack of statistical significance is a result of small point estimates, and
not so much a result of large standard errors.
It thus appears that concerns about wage inequality—although such concerns are
clearly present, as shown in the preceding sections—is not an important determinant
of individuals’ party identification with the exception of the support for the O¨VP.
Thus it indeed appears that issues such as immigration and the environment, inter
alia, dominate economic issues with respect to party identification.
Table 5 Stated party preference
SPO¨ O¨VP FPO¨ The green party
Mean 0.324 0.243 0.109 0.124
Standard deviation 0.468 0.430 0.311 0.329
Demand for
redistribution
0.071
(0.081)
0.093
(0.083)
-0.135*
(0.084)
-0.106
(0.067)
0.017
(0.067)
0.033 0.021
(0.048)
0.006
(0.051)
Controls
included?
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Self-interested
motives included?
No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Beliefs included? No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
# observations 534 534 534 534 534 534 534 534
P-value (F-statistic) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.005 0.023 0.000 0.000
Adjusted R-squared 0.058 0.064 0.063 0.059 0.026 0.029 0.142 0.142
Notes: *, **, *** denote statistical significance on the 10, 5, and 1% level, respectively. Robust standard
errors in parentheses. See also notes of Table 3
16 The same calculation for the largest effect, i.e. the effect running from the demand for redistribution on
the probability of stating preference for the conservative party, yields a predicted change of slightly more
than three percentage points.
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5 Conclusions
In this paper, I study subjective estimates of wage inequality and the demand for
redistribution in Austria, using a simple empirical framework that mainly builds on
individuals’ estimates of both actual and ethical wages of several specific
occupations. This framework explicitly distinguishes between individuals’ percep-
tions and normative beliefs as regards the distribution of wages, which then leads to
a natural measure of the demand for redistribution as the desired reduction in the
perceived level of wage inequality.
A first key result of this paper is that most individuals would prefer a distribution
of occupational wages that is more equal than the distribution they perceive to
actually exist, and this desired reduction in overall wage inequality is driven by both
a desire to increase wages at the bottom and to decrease wages at the top of the
distribution. Further, and in line with previous evidence, self-interested motives do
explain part of the variation in the demand for redistribution, but perceptions of
inequality and normative beliefs with respect to inequality appear to be at least as
important.
As expected, the various subjective inequality measures in turn are substantially
significant predictors of individuals’ support for redistribution by the state.
Individuals with a high demand for redistribution, with a high level of perceived
wage inequality or with a low level of ethical wage inequality tend to support
intervention by the government in order to reduce existing inequalities. On the other
hand, however, there is no substantial association between subjective inequality
indices and individuals’ party identification.
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Appendix A: Variable definitions
A.1 Occupational wages
Individuals were asked two questions about occupational wages (the wording is
taken from the source questionnaire of the ISSP):
1. ‘‘We would like to know what you think people in these jobs actually earn.
Please write how much you think they actually earn each month (before taxes
and social security contributions). Many people are not exactly sure about this,
but your best guess will be close enough.’’
2. ‘‘Next, what do you think people in these jobs ought to be paid. How much do
you think they should earn each month (before taxes and social security
contributions), regardless of what they actually earn.’’
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Individuals were then asked to estimate actual and just wages of people working
in the following ten jobs (in the same order as in the survey):
1. ‘‘A skilled worker in a factory’’ (skilled worker)
2. ‘‘A doctor in general practice’’ (doctor)
3. ‘‘The chairman of a large national company’’ (chairman)
4. ‘‘A lawyer’’ (lawyer)
5. ‘‘A shop assistant in a big store’’ (shop assistant)
6. ‘‘The owner–manager of a large factory’’ (owner factory)
7. ‘‘A judge in the constitutional court’’ (judge)
8. ‘‘An unskilled worker in a factory’’ (unskilled worker)
9. ‘‘A cabinet minister in the Federal Government’’ (minister)
10. ‘‘Your own occupation’’ (coworker)
The phrasing in parentheses is the corresponding label used in the text, figures
and tables. All variables computed from these occupational wage estimates are
discussed in detail in Sect. 3 and 1 in the main text.
A.2 Independent variables
Family income
Family income is only available as a discrete variable with only a few different
values. I use the midpoints of these intervals as values on the variable.
Income dissatisfaction
This variable corresponds to the ratio of just and actual wage for individual i’s
coworkers, that is (yðiÞeCoworker=yðiÞaCoworkerÞ, where yðiÞaCoworker denotes i’s estimate
of what people in his occupation actually earn and yðiÞeCoworker denotes what
individual i thinks that people in his occupation ought to earn.
Mobility
I use the difference between the following two scales to construct a simple index of
(upward) mobility: (1) ‘‘In our society there are groups which tend to be towards
the top and groups which tend to be toward the bottom. Below is a scale that runs
from top to bottom. Where would you put yourself on this scale?’’ (2) ‘‘And ten years
ago, where did you fit in then?’’
Both scales range from 1 (‘‘very bottom’’) to 10 (‘‘very top’’). The index of
social mobility is measured as position today minus position ten years ago and so
possible values range from -9 to ?9 (with higher values indicating more upward
mobility).
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Needs
This variable is a simple scale constructed from two different variables: ‘‘In
deciding how much people ought to earn, how important should each of these things
be, in your opinion?’’ (1) ‘‘What is needed to support your family.’’ (2)‘‘Whether the
person has children to support.’’
The original two variables range from 1 (‘‘strong disagreement’’) to 5 (‘‘strong
agreement’’). The scale that used in the analysis is the simple average over these two
items and therefore also ranges from 1 to 5. (The four regressors discussed below
are constructed in an analogous way.)
Effort
A scale made up of five different questions: ‘‘In deciding how much people ought to
earn, how important should each of these things be, in your opinion?’’ (1) ‘‘How
much responsibility goes with the job.’’ (2) ‘‘The number of years spent in education
and training.’’ (3) ‘‘Whether the job requires supervising others.’’ (4) ‘‘How well he
or she does the job.’’ (5) ‘‘How hard he or she works at the job.’’
Ascribed skills
Underlying this scale are two questions related to whether ascribed characteristics
are important for getting ahead in life: ‘‘We have some questions about
opportunities for getting ahead.’’ (1) ‘‘How important is coming from a wealthy
family?’’ (2) ‘‘Knowing the right people?’’
Acquired skills
This scale is generated from two items. The two items reflect to what extent people
think that acquired skills are important in determining one’s pay: ‘‘We have some
questions about opportunities for getting ahead.’’ (1) ‘‘Do you agree or disagree? In
Austria, people get rewarded for their effort.’’ (2) ‘‘In Austria, people get rewarded
for their intelligence and skills.’’
Perception of conflicts
Another scale, constructed from five different questions about the perception of
different conflict in society: ‘‘In all countries, there are differences or even conflicts
between different social groups. In your opinion, in Austria how much conflict is
there between...’’ (1) ‘‘Poor people and rich people?’’ (2) ‘‘The working class and
the middle class?’’ (3) ‘‘Management and workers?’’ (4) ‘‘People at the top of
society and people at the bottom?’’ (5) ‘‘Young people and older people?’’
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Appendix B: Additional table
See Table 6
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